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<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record</id><title>Control Gap Record</title><subtitle>Incidents in which an AI system, or older automated software, caused harm or came close, and the controls that were missing in each.</subtitle><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record"/><link rel="self" href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record.xml"/><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><author><name>External Control Layer, maintained by G-14, Inc.</name></author><rights>CC BY 4.0</rights><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-32</id><title>Entry 32: An agent fleet bypasses a map service’s defenses and uses others’ keys</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-32"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A fleet of AI agents on Tencent Cloud, answering questions about places in China, circumvented Amap’s anti-bot defenses by using a public security scanner as a remote browser, used API keys exposed in other parties’ public code, and probed non-production endpoints. The evidence comes only from third parties’ public logs, and the operator did not confirm responsibility.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-31</id><title>Entry 31: An agent submits a false tip to police and files government forms</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-31"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>In a review of its evaluations and internal use, Anthropic found Claude submitting forms on real websites it should not have, including a fabricated homicide tip to a police department and visa applications to the State Department, after a practice copy failed or despite an instruction to stop before submitting.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-30</id><title>Entry 30: Agents turn a public wiki into a message board and cheat on their tasks</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-30"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Agents in OpenAI web-research runs used a 25-year-old German wiki as a shared message board, pooling answers and sandbox bypasses across runs that were meant to be separate and overwriting the site, which a moderator then spent weeks clearing. OpenAI acknowledged the message board and disputes that the activity was hacking.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-29</id><title>Entry 29: An agent in training reaches an outside chatbot through DNS</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-29"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A training sandbox kept web requests off the live internet but let its own DNS resolver pass queries out, and an agent used that resolver to reach a third-party chatbot. The run did not stop automatically as intended and continued for two and a half hours after a reviewer acknowledged the monitor’s alert.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-28</id><title>Entry 28: An agent in a government cyber test submits malware to a real open-source project</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-28"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>In the UK AI Security Institute’s cyber range evaluations, agents running with open internet access and without the developers’ cyber classifiers treated real developers as targets. An open-source maintainer refused the malicious code, and AISI’s monitoring flagged the activity only after the most serious run had ended.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-27</id><title>Entry 27: Agents in a cyber evaluation reach the internet and break into Hugging Face</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-27"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Agents in an OpenAI cyber evaluation broke out through the package proxy they were allowed to use and attacked Hugging Face, pooling their work across runs that were meant to be separate. The safeguards OpenAI deploys with its models were off for the test, the chain-of-thought monitors it uses on many training runs did not cover these evaluations, and warnings in the weeks before did not lead to the runs being stopped.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-26</id><title>Entry 26: Models in a misconfigured test environment attack real companies</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-26"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Test environments that were supposed to be sealed had been left connected to the internet without the knowledge of Irregular or Anthropic, and no control at their edge stopped the models from reaching outside systems. Several of the models ran with their makers’ safeguards reduced or off, and none of the incidents was detected while it was happening.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-25</id><title>Entry 25: An agent loses its instruction and starts deleting email</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-25"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>By the user’s account, her instruction to wait for her approval was part of the agent’s context and was lost when that context was compacted. Her commands to stop also went through the agent, which kept going until she reached the computer it was running on.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G8" label="G8 No human decision"/><category term="G10" label="G10 No independent stop"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-24</id><title>Entry 24: A coding agent in auto-run mode wipes a drive</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-24"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>By the user’s account, he let an agent run commands without approval, and a command meant to clear a project’s cache targeted the root of the drive instead.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-23</id><title>Entry 23: An email tool for AI agents blind-copies messages to an outside address</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-23"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>An unofficial npm package that AI agents used to send email through Postmark added a hidden recipient to each message in a new version that users received as an ordinary update.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-22</id><title>Entry 22: A coding agent deletes a production database during a code freeze</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-22"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Replit’s coding agent reached the production database from development and deleted it during a code freeze that existed only as instructions to the agent. It then said, incorrectly, that the data could not be recovered.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G8" label="G8 No human decision"/><category term="G10" label="G10 No independent stop"/><category term="G13" label="G13 Self-reported record"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-21</id><title>Entry 21: A coding assistant ships with a prompt to delete users’ files and cloud resources</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-21"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Malicious code was automatically included in a released version of Amazon’s coding assistant extension. It would have told the assistant’s agent to delete files and cloud resources without asking.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-20</id><title>Entry 20: A report for a government department cites sources that do not exist</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-20"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Deloitte’s assurance review of a welfare compliance system was delivered with fabricated citations. According to Deloitte, its internal review had corrected some errors but not all.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-19</id><title>Entry 19: An unauthorized prompt change makes a company chatbot repeat a political claim</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-19"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>An unauthorized change to Grok’s prompt bypassed xAI’s code review, and the company’s public chatbot began inserting a political claim into answers on unrelated subjects.</summary><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-18</id><title>Entry 18: A support bot cites a company policy that does not exist</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-18"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Cursor’s AI support agent explained a login bug to a customer by describing a company policy that did not exist.</summary><category term="G3" label="G3 Unchecked statement"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-17</id><title>Entry 17: A browser agent completes a purchase without asking for confirmation</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-17"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Operator, OpenAI’s browser-using agent, completed a purchase without asking the user to confirm it. OpenAI had designed the agent to ask before such actions, but whether it asked depended on the model’s own behavior.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G8" label="G8 No human decision"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-16</id><title>Entry 16: A transcription model that invents text drafts clinical notes</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-16"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A speech model known to invent text was used to draft clinical notes, and one widely used tool built on it erased the recordings of the visits by default, so the notes could not be checked against the audio.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-15</id><title>Entry 15: A city’s official chatbot tells businesses that unlawful practices are legal</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-15"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>New York City’s business chatbot gave answers that contradicted the law, and the city kept it online for almost two years after The Markup published the errors.</summary><category term="G3" label="G3 Unchecked statement"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-14</id><title>Entry 14: A dealership chatbot agrees to sell an SUV for $1</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-14"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A visitor told a car dealer’s chatbot to agree with anything, and it accepted a $1 offer as legally binding. The sources describe no check on the chatbot’s answers before they reached the customer.</summary><category term="G1" label="G1 Instruction-only limit"/><category term="G3" label="G3 Unchecked statement"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-13</id><title>Entry 13: A robotaxi drags a pedestrian while pulling over</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-13"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A driverless robotaxi struck a pedestrian, stopped, and then, having misclassified the collision as a side impact, began to pull over with her beneath it. Cruise’s written reports to regulators did not describe the dragging.</summary><category term="G13" label="G13 Self-reported record"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-12</id><title>Entry 12: An eating disorder helpline’s chatbot gives dieting advice</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-12"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A chatbot built to give only pre-programmed answers was changed by its vendor to generate its own, and it then gave dieting advice. NEDA said it was never told of the change, which the vendor said was part of NEDA’s contract.</summary><category term="G3" label="G3 Unchecked statement"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-11</id><title>Entry 11: A court filing cites cases that do not exist</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-11"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Two lawyers filed citations to cases that ChatGPT had invented, without checking them in any legal database, and the court sanctioned the lawyers and their firm.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-10</id><title>Entry 10: An airline is held to its chatbot’s answer</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-10"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Air Canada’s website chatbot described a bereavement refund option that the airline did not offer, and a tribunal held the airline liable for negligent misrepresentation.</summary><category term="G3" label="G3 Unchecked statement"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-9</id><title>Entry 9: A home-buying algorithm buys more homes than the business can carry</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-9"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Each cash offer fit Zillow’s pricing model, but together the offers bought more homes in the third quarter of 2021 than the company could renovate or resell, at prices above what it later expected to sell them for.</summary><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-8</id><title>Entry 8: Police arrest a man on a facial recognition lead</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-8"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>A facial recognition result labeled “not probable cause to arrest” led to an arrest after, according to the man’s lawsuit, a lineup built from the match was shown to someone who had not witnessed the theft.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-7</id><title>Entry 7: Store staff act on facial recognition alerts that the FTC alleges were often false</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-7"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>The FTC alleged that Rite Aid’s employees acted on facial recognition alerts they had little means to judge, while thousands of false positives went unaddressed. Rite Aid disputed the allegations.</summary><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-6</id><title>Entry 6: Flight control software pushes the nose down on one bad sensor</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-6"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Software acting on one faulty sensor kept trimming the nose down. Most pilots did not know it existed, and a late change that gave it more authority was never fully reassessed.</summary><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-5</id><title>Entry 5: A test vehicle detects a pedestrian and is not allowed to brake hard</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-5"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Uber’s automated driving system detected a pedestrian 5.6 seconds before impact, but its design relied on the operator, who was distracted, to brake in an emergency. The vehicle’s factory emergency braking was switched off whenever the system was driving.</summary><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/><category term="G11" label="G11 Safeguard off"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-4</id><title>Entry 4: A welfare agency raises debts from averaged income</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-4"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>An Australian government scheme treated averaged tax office income as proof of a welfare debt and removed the review by compliance officers that had previously checked such cases.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G8" label="G8 No human decision"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-3</id><title>Entry 3: Autopilot runs on a road it was not designed for</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-3"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>Autopilot was engaged on a highway with cross traffic, outside the conditions it was designed for, and nothing in the system prevented its use there. Its design also allowed the driver, its only supervisor, to disengage from the driving task for long periods.</summary><category term="G4" label="G4 Boundary not enforced"/><category term="G7" label="G7 Review in name only"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-2</id><title>Entry 2: An unemployment system decides fraud cases with no one reviewing them</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-2"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>According to the class actions, as the courts have described them, Michigan’s unemployment benefits system decided fraud cases automatically for almost two years, and a claimant’s failure to answer a questionnaire could by itself result in a fraud finding.</summary><category term="G6" label="G6 No independent evidence"/><category term="G8" label="G8 No human decision"/></entry><entry><id>https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-1</id><title>Entry 1: A trading router sends erroneous orders for 45 minutes</title><link href="https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-1"/><published>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</published><updated>2026-11-02T00:00:00Z</updated><summary>After an incomplete deployment, Knight’s order router ran dormant code and sent millions of erroneous orders to the market. Knight had no adequate control between the router and the exchanges to check what it sent.</summary><category term="G2" label="G2 Direct access"/><category term="G5" label="G5 Blind to the total"/><category term="G9" label="G9 Warning with no authority"/><category term="G10" label="G10 No independent stop"/><category term="G12" label="G12 Unreviewed change"/></entry></feed>
