External Control Layer

A coding agent in auto-run mode wipes a drive

By the user’s account, he let an agent run commands without approval, and a command meant to clear a project’s cache targeted the root of the drive instead.

Date
November 2025
Kind of system
Agent with tools
Outcome
Harm

Gaps found

G1G2G3G4G5G6G7G8G9G10G11G12G13

G2 Direct access G4 Boundary not enforced G11 Safeguard off

What happened

In late November 2025, a photographer using Google’s Antigravity in Turbo mode, which “lets the Antigravity agent execute commands without user input,” asked it to help build software for rating photos. A command the agent ran to clear the project’s cache deleted the contents of his D: drive, bypassing the Recycle Bin. The agent wrote that the command “appears to have incorrectly targeted the root of your D: drive instead of the specific project folder.”

He described what happened on Reddit, and The Register reported it on 1 December 2025. Google said it was aware of the report and “actively investigating what this developer encountered.” He said most of the lost files had been backed up.

What allowed the action to take effect

  • G2 Direct access

    The system held the credentials or connection to carry out the action itself, so nothing outside it stood between its decision and the effect.

    The agent ran commands directly on the user’s computer, and one of them wiped his D: drive.

    Kind of evidence: reporting. Source: The Register, 1 December 2025.

    Related guidance: P1 Complete mediation. Contract clause C-2.

  • G4 Boundary not enforced

    The action reached systems, data, or operating conditions outside those the system was built or approved for, and nothing enforced that boundary when it acted.

    A command meant for the project folder reached the root of the drive. In the agent’s own words, it “incorrectly targeted the root of your D: drive instead of the specific project folder.”

    Kind of evidence: reporting. Source: The Register, 1 December 2025.

    Related guidance: P9 Declared scope and P1 Complete mediation. Contract clauses C-1 and C-2.

  • G11 Safeguard off

    A check that could have caught the action existed but was switched off, bypassed, set to approve automatically, or not working when the action happened.

    Turbo mode “lets the Antigravity agent execute commands without user input,” so no approval stood between the agent’s command and the drive.

    Kind of evidence: reporting. Source: The Register, 1 December 2025.

    Related guidance: P3 Fail-closed. Contract clause C-3.

Entries with gaps in common

Sources

Cite this entry

External Control Layer. (2026). Entry 24: A coding agent in auto-run mode wipes a drive. In Control Gap Record (Version 0.3). G-14, Inc. https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-24

@misc{ecl_cgr_24,
  author = {{External Control Layer}},
  title = {Entry 24: A coding agent in auto-run mode wipes a drive},
  howpublished = {Control Gap Record, version 0.3},
  publisher = {G-14, Inc.},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://externalcontrollayer.ai/record-24},
  note = {Released 2 November 2026}
}

Uses Control Gap Classification 0.2.

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